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2.3 Year 2000 National Campaigns
As Known in 2003
INTRODUCTION, WHAT HAPPENED ON THE REPUBLICAN SIDE
To understand what happened in the 2000 election, let's start on the Republican
side. Fred Steeper of Market Strategies in Michigan has been ATI's republican
pollster and a member of the ATI polling design team since 1987. He was George
Bush senior's pollster in both the '88 and '92 elections and was George W Bush's
pollster in the 2000 campaign and, as of this writing, a pollster for President
Bush through 2003. I'll call the younger Bush, "W".
W told Steeper at the beginning that polling would not be very important for him because he is a leader and does not need to ask the public what it wants him to do. He knew what he would do if elected. He needed to know how to get elected by best stating his positions in ways that the public understands and appreciates. He had to sell himself and his ideas and only for that did he need polling. In short, he was a typical politician wanting only "What-do-I-say" polls.
As the campaign progressed Steeper realized that if he put together what all the public’s responses in the Republican polls in each area meant he could tell W a lot about what the public wanted too. This was not unexpected. As mentioned in EARLIER CAMPAIGNS, the ATI polling team had already seen that. Steeper called the process “connecting the dots”.
Steeper told me neither W nor any of his top advisors, when gathered at poll finding briefings that Steeper conducted, noticed how to “connect the dots” and would not welcome an attempt by Steeper to do that. It would have sounded like Steeper was saying to the distinguished candidate and his advisors, “You’re all wrong.” Consultants who say that in campaigns are usually shown the door – permanently.
NOW WHAT HAPPENED ON THE DEMOCRATIC SIDE
I quote widely from the very helpful article “Presidency by Poll” by John F.
Harris, a Post staff reporter, on pp. 9-10 of the Jan. 8-14th issue of the
Washington Post National Weekly Edition, that came out just after W had become
President-elect. Harris explained that since the ‘96 election, Clinton had
become a devoted aficionado of polling, analyzing the meaning of polls like an
expert. In other words, in Steeper's language Clinton was connecting the dots.
Clinton was following the polls of Mark J. Penn, who was originally brought in
by Dick Morris to take responsibility for the polling required in Morris program
that put Clinton over the top in ‘96. The article, lightly edited, states: (all
quotes from Harris’ article are in green)
“Clinton had fired his early pollster, Stanley Greenberg. Four current and former Clinton aides say the president told them he preferred his new pollsters, Morris and Penn, because they do not merely diagnose problems – they tell me what to do.” This confirmed what I wrote (LCD, The Book) when Greenberg told me six years earlier, ‘I take it as a badge of honor that I never told the President what to do.’ Greenberg's attitude had not changed in all that time.
Harris did not recognize that the difference between the success of Penn-advised candidates who learn “what-to-do” and the failure of Greenberg-advised candidates who only learn “what-to-say” was due to the two different approaches to polling. Harris’ closing conclusions make the case clear. [I insert my comments in blue in these square brackets that translate Harris’ reasoning into Public-Interest Polling language.]
“While Penn was still Gore’s advisor, the two exchanged sharp words on whether ‘Clinton fatigue’ would be a major factor in the 2000 elections. Penn insisted the answer was no; Gore devoutly believed it was yes and fired Penn a few days later. Greenberg became a key advisor to Gore. Greenberg’s devotees believe Gore found his natural voice as a candidate only when he abandoned the tepid brand of politics Penn espoused.” [‘tepid’ is the campaign advisors way of describing doing what the public wants rather than what they want. In any case, Gore fired Penn, took on Greenberg and lost. Most folks, right left, and center agree that Gore did not run as good a campaign as he could have. A better campaign would almost certainly have elected him.] Continuing with Harris’ article [and my bracketed comments]:
“There was another candidate in 2000 who had been advised by important Democratic lobbyists and strategists to fire Penn but chose not to: Hillary Rodham Clinton. Penn's role in her New York Senate campaign ruffled as many feathers as his White House work. All through 2000, an argument brewed between Clinton’s consultants in Washington – an uneasy alliance of Penn and media consultants in Washington – and her campaign staff in New York. The New Yorkers wanted her to spend more time promoting her biography and addressing voters’ doubts about her personality; Penn insisted that she talk almost exclusively about issues.” [Public-Interest Polling has found over and over again that the public is much more concerned with what will be done on the major issues, which affect many more of them, than on items that have little or no direct effect]. “Things got so bad, campaign aides say, that last summer the candidate angrily summoned both sides in the White House to order an end the feuding.”
“In the end, Hillary Clinton's 55% victory left Penn vindicated. Late in Clinton’s term, even officials in the White House who once scorned it have become reconciled to the Morris-Penn style of politics [finding out what people really want on the issues.] Ultimately, Penn succeeded because his notion of politics meshed perfectly with that of the president who was his patron. ‘I believe strongly in Democratic activism if you do it the right way', Penn says.’ The right way is one that gets results through consensus [i.e. heals the disconnect]. The wrong way is one that seeks to divide the country [i.e. chooses policy without knowing or caring what the public wants.]”
The election 2000 campaign differed from campaigns before 1990, like night and day. To see how much has changed press EARLIER CAMPAIGNS.
| >>> 2.3a Earlier Campaigns |